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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
If democracy in Russia is being criticized that means that it exists. (1) 
Prime Minister Putin certainly has his hands full these days.  In addition to the 
responsibilities of securing Russia’s emergence from the ongoing economic 
crisis, the familiar, pesky modernization debate continues among Russia’s 
political elite, and even his most bullying efforts to quell the conversation have 
failed.  Now, the debate not only threatens to taint the public perception of his 
“achievements” in office, but seems to be undermining his political façade, as 
Russia’s fractious political parties consider forming a united front to take on 
Putin’s United Russia. 
 
It seems clear that Putin recognized the pitfalls of a debate on the nature of the 
Russian state and the best path to modernization and political maturity; clearly, 
he hoped his appearance at the State Council meeting on the subject would 
close the book on the discussion.  (2)  Nonetheless, President Medvedev’s 
efforts to differentiate himself from his tandem twin (including efforts to call 
attention to election irregularities that benefited United Russia) have kept the 
spotlight on the issue of modernization and reform of state governance.  
 
Recently, Putin’s (and Medvedev’s) Kremlin ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, tried yet 
again to staunch the debate in an interview devoted to the need to stimulate 
innovation in the economy: “you cannot say that all economies, and all 
democracies look alike. In France there is one type of economy and democracy, 
in Germany another, and in England - a third kind. Plans taken out of books do 
not work in countries like Russia with its specific features. There is no Caucasus 
in other countries, either in Britain or the United States. … the consolidated state 
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[is] a tool of the transition period, a tool of modernization. Some people call it 
authoritarian modernization. I do not care what it is called. Spontaneous 
modernization is a cultural phenomenon (and it is cultural, not political), and it 
has only been achieved in the Anglo-Saxon countries.” (3)  This, of course, 
sounds remarkably akin to Surkov’s previous political-ideological masterpiece:  
Sovereign democracy, which seemed a petulant response to western criticism of 
the diminishment of democratic institutions in the Putin era.  Accordingly, Russia 
has its own unique path toward democracy and any attempts to assess progress 
by non-Russian norms or to hold Russia’s leadership to objective standards of 
democratic behavior are inappropriate, if not culturally insensitive. 
 
While the debates over modernization, innovation, progress, and political 
development all clearly have common threads, Surkov’s formulation draws dire 
lessons from Russia’s experience of transition in the 1990s and rejects this 
earlier phase of Russia’s experience: “However much some people praised us 
for perestroyka, it led to people's blood being shed, starting with Vilnius, Tbilisi, 
the Fergana Valley, and Karabakh. Not to mention Chechnya and Dagestan even 
now. This is the old system still collapsing. It is dying and being reborn, bleeding. 
I think the main task of a democratic society is to look after the people. (…) I am 
not saying that a super-centralized regime is needed now. We need a 
consolidated regime, which is in control of the situation.” (4) 
 
Sadly, Surkov commits the logical error of conflating the effects of the collapse of 
the old system and the need to ameliorate those effects, with the demands of 
positive, forward-looking democratic governance.  The fact that the Soviet Union 
approached its collapse with violent shudders cannot be seen to require Russia’s 
leaders to adopt Soviet methods through a transitional period (and certainly not 
20 years later!). 
 
There have been many rebuttals to Surkov’s comments, many of which see the 
resort to “consolidation” and authoritarian models as a thinly veiled nod to the 
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need to keep Putin’s siloviki clan in power, despite threats of stagnation.  Clearly, 
Medvedev’s program of modernization includes an inherent critique of Putin and 
his era of order and stability, however, Putin is not deaf to the needs of 
competition in the economy.  It is interesting that Surkov’s remarks were made in 
the larger context of comments on innovation and the plans to create a “Silicon 
Valley” in Russia.   Perhaps this ongoing modernization debate reflects an 
internal conflict as the diarchy puzzles out the nature of real competition – 
economic, technological, interstate, even political. 
 
A lesson in competition (and strategic alliances) may be what is on offer in 
Novosibirsk as the three main opposition parties (Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party, and Just Russia) signed an 
agreement to work together to oppose United Russia candidates in the run up to 
regional and local elections scheduled for March 14.  (5) While protest rallies, 
such as that held in Kaliningrad in January, offer tantalizing glimpses of the 
power of oppositional unity at this moment in Russia’s history, the facts remain 
that these parties have divergent, if not antithetical, ideological approaches and 
goals.  Additionally, the diarchical regime, which has appeared unwilling to crack 
down forcefully on protests at this moment, easily could snap out of its 
modernization musings and reassert its authority should any protests or elections 
threaten the security of the regime – or even just one end of the tandem. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Maksim Glikin, Natalya Kostenko interview with Vladislav Surkov, the first 
deputy chief of the Presidential Staff: "'A Miracle is Possible' - Vladislav Surkov, 
the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Staff, Deputy Chairman of the 
Modernization Commission" Vedomosti, 15 Feb 10 via Johnson’s Russia List 
(JRL) 2010-#34, 19 Feb 10. 
(2) “Putin steps forward, Medvedev shrinks back,” The ISCIP Analyst, Volume 
XVI, No. 7, 28 January 10 via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1607a.shtml. 
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(3) Maksim Glikin, Natalya Kostenko interview with Vladislav Surkov, Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Will the Russian Opposition Jointly Oppose the ‘United Russia’ Party?” by 
Igor Dmitriev, Versiya, 15 Feb 10 via JRL, 2010-#38, 24 Feb 10. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
Medvedev launches unprecedented Interior Ministry reforms 
On February 18, 2010, President Medvedev fired seventeen police generals; 
halved the force of the central command of the Interior Ministry to 10, 000; and 
filed bills on reorganization of the Interior Ministry in the Duma. (1) Those 
measures are intended to increase police efficiency and improve the Ministry’s 
image with Russia’s citizens. It also shows that Medvedev is determined to keep 
a firm grip on security structures. 
 
This is the most dramatic purge the Interior Ministry has ever seen; Medvedev 
overnight fired more senior police officials than Putin had removed during the 
eight years of his presidency. (2) Medvedev replaced two of the fired deputy 
interior ministers with senior members of the presidential administration, which is 
consistent with the President’s vow to take the Interior Ministry reform under 
personal control, but also suggests that he might wish to install his own people in 
the Ministry. (3) Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev is retaining his post, and by 
the end of March he must submit proposals on effectively reforming the Interior 
Ministry. His post at the Ministry might depend on this task; fortunately, he can 
ask his new deputies for counsel. 
 
At the end of 2009, Medvedev issued a decree ordering the Interior Ministry to 
cut its staff by 20%. The reform will, thus, affect all levels of employees, from top 
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to bottom. (4) Medvedev clearly disagrees with Putin, who cautions against 
dramatic personnel changes, due to the shortage of qualified professionals. (5) 
 
Low crime solving rates and the latest tragic events involving police officers 
killing innocent citizens have helped trigger the reforms. In the most widely 
publicized incident, intoxicated police chief Denis Evsyukov groundlessly opened 
fire, killing two and wounding seven shoppers at a supermarket last year. (6) 
During his speech at the Interior Ministry board meeting, Medvedev mentioned 
that police authority has eroded even further, following those events. (7) Several 
hours after the speech, the President announced the dismissal of the police 
generals and proposed new legislation to restructure the Interior Ministry. 
 
The proposed bills provide additional grounds for termination from the police 
force; increased penalties for crimes committed by the police; and the 
restructuring of the Interior Ministry. (8) Under the new proposed legislation, a 
gross neglect of duty during the course of performance of official duties would 
constitute additional grounds for termination.  The bill provides a comprehensive 
list of the type of conduct that constitutes gross neglect of duty for the purposes 
of disciplinary sanctioning, including termination. (9) Such conduct includes 
absence from the job for more than four consecutive hours, intoxication on the 
job, and obstructing the work of the agency. The bill also proposes including a 
new section in the Criminal Code to establish sanctions for police officers who fail 
to follow their superiors’ orders, if such failure results in significant harm to 
citizens’ property or to societal interests. (10) 
 
Medvedev’s plan to restructure the Interior Ministry aims to decrease the 
workload of local police departments by transferring some of the Ministry’s 
secondary functions to different agencies. For example, the plan suggests 
transferring control of the drunk tanks to the Health and Social Development 
Ministry. A drunk tank is a facility in which publicly intoxicated persons are 
detained overnight to sober up. (11) Established during Soviet times, they have 
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gained increased scrutiny in recent months after a Tomsk journalist was beaten 
to death by a police officer on duty at the drunk tank. (12) The Interior Ministry 
also no longer would conduct motor vehicle inspections, which are currently a 
major source of bribes for corrupt police officers. More than half of vehicle 
owners prefer paying off the police in order to pass motor vehicle inspection 
instead of risking failure because of some minor defect. (13) Additionally, the 
Ministry no longer would be responsible for deporting illegal aliens; this duty 
would be transferred to the immigration authorities instead. (14) 
 
President Medvedev complimented the Ministry for preventing the crime rate 
from increasing during the financial crisis, but emphasized the importance of 
implementing new anticorruption measures within the Interior Ministry. A 
commission to resolve conflict of interest problems and ensure stricter 
compliance with job duties has been created within the Interior Ministry. (15) 
Staring this year, police officers will be required to submit information regarding 
income and assets for themselves and members of their families. Providing false 
information will be considered a neglect of duty and eventually could result in 
dismissal from the force. The President also promised to increase the police 
officers’ salaries, which are currently around $400-600 per month. (16) “This is 
an issue of a particular significance, considering all the anticorruption tasks that I 
have described,” commented Medvedev. 
 
Critics maintain that these measures might be insufficient and may indeed lead to 
further Interior Ministry destabilization. They point out that there are enough laws 
on the books to hold officials liable; the real problem is lack of enforcement and 
oversight. (17) “The Ministry is reforming itself, without any supervision,” pointed 
out Deputy Chair of the Duma Security Committee, Gennadij Gudkov. He 
proposed establishing an independent committee of parliamentarians and 
citizens to select the Ministry’s top officials. (18) 
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While it is too soon to decide whether the reform will be effective, it is clear that 
the President has taken firmer control of the discredited Interior Ministry and 
demonstrated his will to improve its reputation and effectiveness, while 
reinforcing citizens’ rights. He commented, “It is just the beginning of work, 
further decisions will follow. We understand that it’s just a tip of the iceberg.” (19) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Work on reforming the Interior Ministry the President will keep under 
personal control,” The President of Russia Official Web Portal, 18 Feb 10 via 
http://news.kremlin.ru/news/6909.  
(2) Aleksandra Samarina, “Security territory of Dmitry Medvedev,” Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 19 Feb 10 via http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-02-19/1_safety.html. 
(3) Alexander Bratersky, “Medvedev Orders Deep Police Reforms,” The Moscow 
Times, 19 Feb 10 via http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/400114.html.  
(4) Sergei Nagorny, “The reform picks up speed,” Interfax-Russia.ru, 19 Feb 10 
via http://www.interfax-russia.ru/print.asp?id=126572&type=view. 
(5) Aleksandra Samarina, “Security territory of Dmitry Medvedev,” Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, Ibid. 
(6) Aidar Buribaev, Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Evsyukov sentenced to life 
imprisonment,” Reuters, 19 Feb 10 via 
http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUMSE61I0T620100219.  
(7) “Work on reforming the Interior Ministry,” The President of Russia Official 
Web Portal, Ibid. 
(8) “The police is ordered to reborn,” Interfax, 18 Feb 10 via 
http://www.interfax.ru/society/txt.asp?id=124354. 
(9) “Medvedev filed a bill in the Duma on increasing penalties for the police,” RIA-
Novosti, 18 Feb 10 via http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100218/209798083.html. 
(10) Viktor Hamraev, “President called to order those serving in police,” 
Kommersant, 19 Feb 10 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1324874&NodesID=2. 
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(11) Alexander Bratersky, “Medvedev Orders Deep Police Reforms,” The 
Moscow Times, ibid. 
(12) Anatoly Burov, “A victim of a psychotraumatic situation,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 
20 Jan 10 via http://www.rg.ru/2010/01/20/reg-sibir/popov.html.  
(13) Ilya Zoltman, “President took the most precious away from the Interior 
Ministry,” Utro.Ru, 18 Feb 10 via 
http://www.utro.ru/articles/2010/02/18/874317.shtml. 
(14) “Work on reforming the Interior Ministry,” The President of Russia Official 
Web Portal, Ibid. 
(15) “Medvedev has tackled the Interior Ministry,” KMnews, 18 Feb 10 via 
http://news.km.ru/medvedev_vzyalsya_za_mvd.  
(16) Mikhail Filaleev, ”A policeman for a thousand dollars,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 
13 Jan 09 via http://www.rg.ru/2009/01/13/zarplata.html. 
(17) Viktor Hamraev, “President called to order,” Kommersant, Ibid.  
(18) Sergei Nagorny, “The reform picks up speed,” Interfax-Russia.ru, Ibid. 
(19) “Work on reforming the Interior Ministry,” The President of Russia Official 
Web Portal, Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Russia identifies NATO as primary threat 
President Medvedev announced his approval of Russia’s new military doctrine on 
5 February during a meeting of the National Security Council. (1)  The new 
document covers the period through 2020 and builds upon the previous one 
signed in 2000 by then President Putin.  One of the new additions to the 
document is the identification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
as the primary threat to Russian national security.  
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Specifically, the doctrine cited, “the desire to endow the force potential of…NATO 
with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and 
to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the 
borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc.” (2)  In the 
2000 version of Russia’s military doctrine, it identified the threat posed by 
alliances like NATO as, “[T]he expansion of military blocs and alliances to the 
detriment of the Russian Federation's military security.” (3)  Although the addition 
of NATO as a specific threat is not surprising, it does indicate Russia’s intention 
to address the persistent influence of NATO within its near abroad. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded steadily and recently has 
placed Montenegro, a former Yugoslav republic, on track for membership in the 
alliance.  In addition, public debate regarding NATO membership has gained 
momentum in Serbia, attracting the attention of Moscow. (4)  Russia’s envoy to 
NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin stated, “[H]e could not understand Serbia’s political and 
military elite that supported entry into NATO.” (5)  He went on to say Russia 
would reconsider its stance on Kosovo recognition if Serbia joined NATO. (6)  
Perhaps, Serbia has decided to limit its exposure to the price Russia demands 
for cooperation.  According to military analyst Aleksandar Radic, “Serbia [has] 
paid the price for Russia not recognizing Kosovo’s independence by establishing 
economic ties with it on Moscow’s own terms.” (7)  Regardless, Russia is 
concerned with the continued expansion of NATO and the impact it will have on 
Russian influence in the region. 
 
Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council 
confirmed Moscow’s desire to limit NATO’s influence within Russia’s near abroad 
during a recent interview on the new military doctrine.  He stated, “The expansion 
of NATO represents quite a serious threat to Russia….former Warsaw Pact 
states and certain countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union are [now] 
members of the Alliance. They draw with them other states - Georgia and 
Ukraine - that may potentially join NATO.” (8)  Following this line of thought, the 
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threat NATO represents to Russia is not that of a military invasion, rather it is the 
threat to Russian primacy within its perceived sphere of “privileged interests.” (9) 
 
Russian analyst Pavel Felgenhauer recently commented, “Moscow…is resolved 
to be a regional superpower – the strong man in its neighborhood (as Iran 
aspires to be in the Middle East).” (10)  He goes on to say that Russia will 
cooperate with NATO only if the West gives Moscow a “free hand in Eastern 
Europe,” similar to the deal struck at Yalta in 1945. (11)  Only a few days ago, 
Russian and Abkhaz defense ministers signed a deal allowing Moscow to use 
and update an existing Abkhaz military base for the next 49 years. (12)  It will 
hold up to 3,000 troops, including units of the FSB. (13)  President Medvedev 
said the agreement “provide[s] a framework for the peaceful development of 
Abkhazia as an independent state.” (14)  Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has strictly protested the action. (15)  NATO and Western powers are concerned 
that a Russian military buildup in Abkhazia threatens Georgia’s territorial 
integrity. (16) 
 
Although Russia identified NATO as its primary threat, the alliance appears 
committed to taking steps to improve the relationship.  NATO’s Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, “To make NATO the main threat to 
Russia simply doesn’t reflect realities…NATO is not an enemy of Russia.  On the 
contrary, we want to develop a strategic partnership with Russia.” (17)  In fact, 
NATO has backed this comment up and invited Russia, for the first time, to 
provide input on the alliance’s new draft strategic concept. (18)  The alliance also 
did not object to France’s proposed arms deal that may send a Mistral-class 
helicopter carrier to Russia. (19)  Secretary-General Rasmussen stated, “It 
should be possible for NATO allies to have a normal trade relationship with 
Russia.  If we could develop a true strategic partnership, then exchanging military 
equipment would not be that controversial.” (20) 
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Despite NATO’s effort to develop a closer strategic partnership with Russia, 
many differences remain.  In a recent interview, retired Col-Gen Leonid Ivashov, 
President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems said, “[I]t is a fact that today 
Western countries led by the Unites States are preparing for a real war, and this 
cannot but be a threat to us…NATO is arming itself and expanding.” (21)  So far, 
the message of strategic cooperation offered by NATO does not appear to be 
gaining traction with Russia’s military elite.  
 
Pavel Felgenhauer summed up the differences between the two sides this way, 
“Russia sees the West and the United States as its main enemy – politically, 
ideologically, economically, and militarily.  That is how it is seen from Russia, but 
not from the West.  These are very serious differences that cannot be overcome 
just by brandishing small yellow boxes with red buttons.” (22)  In defending its 
“privileged interests,” Russia undoubtedly will challenge NATO’s influence and 
expansion in the future.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Medvedev signs Russia's new military doctrine, RIA Novosti, 5 Feb 10 via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) (Corr) Text of newly approved Russian military doctrine, President of the 
Russian Federation website, 5 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Apr 00, accessed via 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00. 
(4) Serbian commentary says NATO "suddenly" becoming main issue in country, 
Politika, 18 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) Envoy warns Belgrade Russia “will have to recognize Kosovo” if Serbia joins 
NATO, Blic, 10 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Russian security supremo names NATO expansion as key threat, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(9) For a description of Russia’s “privileged interests” see:  Interview given by 
Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels One, Rossia, NTV, 31 Aug 08, 
accessed via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.s
html. 
(10) New Military Doctrine underscores Kremlin’s aspirations to become regional 
superpower, Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10 Feb 10. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Russia Gains Base In Abkhazia, RFERL, 17 February 10, accessed via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Gains_Military_Base_In_Abkhazia/1960545.
html. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Georgia concerned about Russia’s increased military presence in 
breakaway region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 18 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(16) Russia Gains Base In Abkhazia, RFERL, 17 Feb 10, Ibid. 
(17) NATO Chief ‘Surprised’ By Russia’s Listing Alliance As Threat, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 Feb 10; accessed via 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1950647.html. 
(18) Anders Fogh Rasmussen:  Reaching Out to Russia, Newsweek, 22 Feb 10 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(19) NATO Head Does Not Object to Proposed French Warship Sale to Russia, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 Feb 10, accessed via 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1954560.html. 
(20) Anders Fogh Rasmussen:  Reaching Out to Russia, Newsweek, 22 Feb 10 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(21) Retired Russian general views Western "threat", defends Iran's position, 
Centre TV, 11 Feb 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(22) The ‘Reset’ At One Year:  The View From Moscow, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 Feb 10, accessed via 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1949825.html. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
As tensions rise in Middle East, Russia hedges bets 
The visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Moscow (16-18 
February), during which he met with Russian President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin, was preceded by some unusually harsh statements about Iran's 
nuclear program from senior figures in the Russian government, highlighting the 
continued importance of the Middle East in Russian foreign policy. 
 
During Netanyahu's visit, the Israeli prime minster called for “crippling sanctions” 
to be imposed immediately on Iran. His comments were foreshadowed in a blunt 
warning by Security Council Chairman Nikolai Patrushev on February 9 to Iran's 
leadership: "Iran says it doesn't want to have nuclear weapons,” said Patrushev, 
“but its actions, including its decision to enrich uranium to 20 percent, have 
raised doubts among other nations, and these doubts are quite well-founded." (1) 
The message from Moscow to Tehran seems clear: if you act recklessly, don't 
count on us bailing you out. Perhaps the Israelis, therefore, interpreted this as a 
low point in Russian-Iranian relations and rushed to take advantage of the 
opportunity when it presented itself. 
 
 14 
While there is little doubt that Iran was the reason for Netanyahu's visit, the 
results of the three-day diplomatic excursion are less clear. The Israeli prime 
minister's calls for crippling sanctions were quietly ignored by his host Medvedev, 
who declared that Russia's position regarding Iran's nuclear program remains 
unchanged: in other words, Russia urges Iran to cooperate further with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, thereby convincing the international 
community of the true peaceful intentions of its nuclear program. (2) In fact, it is 
unlikely that Netanyahu had hoped for anything more in that respect. Even if 
Russia were to agree to the types of sanctions he was proposing (a very unlikely 
scenario, given Russia's past behavior in this regard), approval would still require 
the cooperation of China. It is unlikely that Netanyahu maintains any illusions 
about the ability of Israel to persuade the international community to unite in its 
interests. Far more likely, the call for immediate, crippling sanctions had two 
purposes: one, to convey the degree to which Israel is concerned that Iran is, in 
fact, building a nuclear weapon; and two, as a warning that it may be on the 
verge of taking military action. This last element of Netanyahu's message has 
several dimensions. 
 
Since the beginning of February, conflicting statements have been made by 
various Russian officials concerning the fulfillment of a contract to deliver to Iran 
the advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. The missiles, which can 
intercept aircraft at a distance of 150 kilometers, would make an Israeli pre-
emptive strike far more complicated to carry out. This fact makes the S-300 
deal—and, by extension, Russia—very important both for Iran and Israel. As late 
as 15 February, while Netanayahu was already in Moscow meeting with the 
Russian leadership, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir 
Nazarov affirmed that the missiles would be delivered as planned according to 
the contract, stressing that their defensive purpose makes the sale fully legal 
under international agreements. (3) Two days later, however, Federal Military-
Technological Cooperation Service Director Mikhail Dmitriyev said that no time 
frame has been established yet for the delivery of the S-300, while Vladimir 
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Kasparyants—chief designer of the arms manufacturer Almaz-Antei, which 
produces the missile system—reportedly stated that there were no technical 
problems with the system, and that delays in its delivery were political. (4) Given 
all this back-and-forth about the S-300 deal, many observers concluded that this 
was precisely the central issue that Netanyahu had come to discuss in Moscow. 
 
Speculation abounds that the meetings may have resulted in a secret deal 
between Israel and Russia: Russia would withhold delivery of the S-300 in 
exchange for Israeli guarantees to suspend any arms deliveries to Georgia. 
Netanyahu, in fact, alluded vaguely to such a deal in a post-meeting press 
conference, stating that Israel “takes into consideration Russian concerns and 
interests, and expects Russia to do the same in regards to matters related to our 
security.” (5) If it proves true that a “Georgia-for-Iran” deal was reached, several 
questions immediately arise about its implications. 
 
First, the latest Russian flip-flopping on the delivery of the S-300 is nothing new. 
On the contrary, fulfillment of the contract (which was signed in December 2005), 
already has been delayed repeatedly, with technical problems being cited as the 
reason for the delays. Similarly, Israeli military assistance to Georgia has been 
effectively suspended since the August 2008 war with Russia (according to a 
number of reports, Israel began withdrawing aid even before the war – as soon 
as it came to realize that a clash was imminent). (6) Thus, if such a deal was 
struck, it would not necessarily represent something new, but rather the 
formalization an arrangement already in effect. 
 
Second, it is hard to imagine a more asymmetric quid-pro-quo, if it can be called 
that. Iran is a central national security issue for Israel and is viewed as an 
existential threat. Georgia, while seen by Russia as belonging to its “sphere of 
influence,” is obviously not an existential threat and, ultimately, a peripheral 
issue. The arms deals themselves are incomparable, as well. Israeli assistance 
to Georgia may have translated into some battlefield gains for the Georgian 
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military during the war, but it did not (nor could it have been expected to) affect 
the overall outcome. The S-300, on the other hand, could certainly affect the 
outcome of an Israeli preemptive strike, and as such is a strategic weapon. 
Lastly, and most importantly, Russia and Israel are two fundamentally different 
types of states. Israel is a militarily strong regional power, but one that is largely 
preoccupied with its own security. Today's Russia is also a regional power, but 
one with expansive ambitions and a much larger definition of what it sees as its 
area of interest. Thus, Russia's relations with Iran are part of a more general 
strategy of supporting “multi-polarity” (Iran being one of the “poles”) as a 
counterbalance to the United States, therefore their relationship may represent a 
more fundamental element of its foreign policy than Israel’s assistance to 
Georgia. This seems to indicate that Israel's relative interest in making sure this 
arrangement holds was stronger than Russia's, raising the issue of why Russia 
would agree to such an arrangement in the first place. From the Russian 
perspective, there are two possibilities: one, that the deal is more comprehensive 
than supposed; or, that Russia has other reasons to delay the delivery of the S-
300 beyond an alleged quid-pro-quo on Georgia. 
 
So what could Israel have offered to Russia? During the press conference 
Netanyahu did mention, in general terms, the possibility of future Israeli 
technological cooperation with Russia. (7) Interestingly, journalists present never 
raised the question of possible future military cooperation, should Russia heed 
Israeli concerns on the Iranian issue. In fact, given Israel's foreign policy 
priorities, it is very possible that Israel would agree to considerable military 
assistance to Russia, if the latter goes along with it on the Iranian issue. In 
particular, Israeli know-how in the area of military technology (a major weak link 
in the Russian military) could be an important asset to Russia's military 
modernization efforts. There is no evidence, however, that this specific possibility 
was discussed.  
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Russia clearly has been stalling the delivery of the missiles to Iran, and another 
facet of its motivation may involve concerns that it could trigger an attack. Once 
the delivery schedule is set, Israel may decide that the time to act is now, before 
the missiles are in place. There are many reasons why Russia would want to 
avoid such a scenario. For one thing, any such attack would likely target, the 
Russian-contracted nuclear power plant at Bushehr where, as of late 2009, 
dozens of Russian engineers and other staff were present. (8) In addition, it is 
possible that an Israeli attack could spark serious regional conflict, leading to a 
geopolitical re-arrangement that might not be favorable to Russian interests. 
Russia is keen on preventing this. 
 
Like other major nuclear powers, Russia is similarly wary of the addition of 
another member to the club. “God forbid” Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, 
exclaimed Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov – at the same time 
affirming once more that Russia will both oppose sanctions and (eventually) 
deliver the S-300, citing its legality as a defensive weapon. (9) This ambivalent 
attitude towards Iran's nuclear ambitions, against the background of extensive 
Russian involvement in the Iranian nuclear program, is puzzling, to say the least. 
 
Ideally, Russia would prefer to avoid both a nuclear-armed Iran and an Israeli 
attack, while continuing to profit from its dealings with Iran. As time goes on, 
however, this appears less and less likely. As if to drive this point home, just two 
days after Netanyahu's visit to Moscow, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
released a new report stating concern that Iran may be covertly developing a 
nuclear warhead. (10) This report undoubtedly makes Israel's case stronger, 
possibly increasing the likelihood of Israeli military intervention. 
 
By going back-and-forth with Iran on the delivery of the S-300, while apparently 
making a temporary, informal agreement with Israel, Moscow is trying to create 
some space to maneuver in the increasingly tense atmosphere in which it has 
found itself in the Middle East. By holding off on the missile delivery, Russia may 
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be bargaining on at least a delay in an Israeli attack, yet at the same time, if an 
attack occurs soon, the current arrangement allows Russia to distance itself from 
the conflict. Viewed in this light, the recent IAEA announcement may in fact 
provide a convenient opportunity for Russia to justify its abandonment of Iran. On 
the other hand, other options – such as delivering the missiles covertly and 
hoping that they can be installed before Israel takes action – also potentially 
exist. By sending mixed signals to Tel Aviv and Tehran, Moscow's message to 
both is to remind them that whatever happens, much will depend on what Russia 
decides. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Never mind the Poles and forget about the gas glut—Nord Stream ahead! 
On February 12, a permit issued by the Regional Administrative Agency for 
Southern Finland cleared the way for a new natural gas pipeline to pass through 
Finland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) along the floor of the Baltic seabed. 
(1) The pipeline, known as Nord Stream, is a Russian project that will link gas 
fields in Siberia to the European gas transmission grid, bypassing transit 
countries in Eastern Europe. The Finnish Water Permit represented the last 
administrative hurdle remaining for Nord Stream AG, the international gas 
consortium led by Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom, before construction can 
begin on the pipeline that will run 760 miles undersea from Vyborg in Russia to 
Lubmin in Germany. With Finland’s approval of the project now secure, the 
consortium can start laying pipes along the seabed as soon as the winter ice 
sheet melts, which is expected to occur sometime around April Fool’s Day. “We 
will start work on the day when people will laugh,” said Sergei Serdyukov, 
Technical Director at Nord Stream AG. (2) 
 
The Poles will not be laughing 
Polish authorities contend that Gazprom’s real motivation in building Nord 
Stream is to provide an alternative to shipping its gas across transit states, 
including Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland, thereby allowing Russia to threaten gas 
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supplies in Eastern Europe without affecting deliveries to Western Europe. From 
its inception, Polish politicians have opposed Nord Stream, which the Foreign 
Minister once famously referred to as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pipeline, but they 
have discovered that they lack the clout to block the project, which is backed by 
powerful figures in Germany. (3) Fearing that a quarrel between Russia and 
Belarus or Ukraine would leave Poland without gas and without recourse, the 
country’s leaders have been making efforts to reduce dependence on Russian 
pipeline deliveries by diversifying gas supplies, and have developed a plan to 
build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at the northwestern port of 
Swinoujscie. (4) However, Poland’s LNG plan itself could be scuttled by the Nord 
Stream pipeline, since, rather than requiring the pipeline to be buried in the sea 
bed, Germany granted a permit that would allow it to run along the sea floor, 
where it will reduce the depth of the channel leading to Poland’s future LNG 
terminal, potentially preventing the entry of large ships. (5) Although Polish 
officials are working diplomatic channels to appeal the German permit and to 
request that a full technical documentation of the pipeline’s construction details 
be given to Poland, they have all but admitted that their challenge is likely to 
prove ineffectual, “From Poland's point of view this means a failure of Poland's 
energy policy,” said Grazyna Gesicka, who heads the Law and Justice 
parliamentary caucus. “Poland's diplomacy was unable to stop this investment.” 
(6) 
 
Gas glut 
Another obstacle to the success of Nord Stream, this one potentially more 
formidable, can be found on the other side of the globe, in US shale fields, where 
deposits of natural gas formerly thought to be too costly to exploit have been 
brought into production over the past decade. Last year, the US overtook Russia 
to become the world’s largest natural gas producer, driven in part by a rise in 
unconventional output. (7) Rising production in the US has meant less demand 
for LNG imports, causing those cargoes to be rerouted to Europe where they are 
putting downward pressure on spot-market gas prices. With spot prices at about 
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half the level under long-term contracts, European customers in LNG-compatible 
markets have begun replacing Russian gas imports, the price of which is pegged 
to the comparably higher price of oil, with LNG volumes. (8) 
 
Last year, demand for Russian gas among European consumers plummeted, 
due to a three-week shutoff caused by a pricing dispute with Ukraine, depressed 
industrial use amid the global economic downturn, and increased use of LNG 
supplies. In February of this year, Gazprom reported an eight percent drop in its 
third quarter sales, compared to a year ago. (9) The situation is not likely to 
improve soon, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). “I don't have 
very good news for Russia, I'm afraid,” Fatih Birol, IEA Chief Economist, told an 
investment conference in Moscow. “I see a global gas glut hitting until 2015.” (10) 
Gazprom has dismissed this gloomy prognosis, claiming that the supply glut will 
evaporate by 2012, around the time that Nord Stream is expected to achieve full 
capacity. According to Gazprom projections, Russian gas exports to Europe will 
rise by fifteen percent this year over last, and sales to export markets outside of 
the former Soviet Union will more than double by 2030. (11) The company points 
to its sizeable portfolio of long-term contracts that lock in supplies to European 
markets until 2035, at least. (12) 
 
Judging by recent events, however, it would appear that some European 
customers are not content to sit through the current price differential between 
spot and long-term gas purchases, and have approached Gazprom in the hope 
of negotiating more flexible supply arrangements. Last week, Germany’s largest 
utility, E.ON AG, struck a deal with Gazprom to buy a “low double-digit” 
percentage of its pipeline gas supply at spot-market prices. (13) While the gas 
glut is forcing Gazprom to reconsider its pricing arrangements with its European 
customers, it is also raising questions about the commercial viability of Nord 
Stream in the near-term. The pipeline will have a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic 
meters when it comes online in 2011, and when the pipeline achieves full 
capacity in 2012, that volume will increase to 55 billion cubic meters. (14) If these 
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volumes are delivered in addition to current supplies, and European demand for 
gas remains flat as predicted, Nord Stream deliveries will saturate the market 
further and drive down prices. On the other hand, Gazprom may choose, instead, 
to divert some share of the volumes that it currently transports across Ukraine 
and Belarus to Nord Stream, thus pushing Russia’s neighboring states toward 
the margins of the supply chain, while holding European supply levels steady 
until the gas market signals a rebound. In the meantime, Poland has contracted 
for extra gas supplies from Gazprom this year, and will require additional 
volumes in the coming years, at least until it is able to launch its LNG terminal on 
the Baltic Sea. 
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